1.
MacCallum claims that the distinction made between these two types of freedom has never been made sufficiently clear.
Controversy of discussions of absence/presence of freedom in societies comes in four kinds;
1) about the nature of freedom itself
2) about the relationships holding between the attainment of freedom and attainment of other possible social benefits
3) about freedom's ranking among such benefits
4) about the consequence of policies in relation to freedom
Freedom is generally considered a benefit, but it is not the only benefit to society. Recognising this can mean other benefits may at times outweigh freedom.
Disputes about the nature of freedom can be understood as a series of attempts by parties opposing each other to capture for their own side favourable attitudes attaching to the notion of freedom. This is Machiavellian, but disputes about the nature of freedom can also be genuinely put down to confusion.
2.
Whenever freedom of an agent is discussed, it means freedom from constraint, restriction, barrier, not doing, becoming or not becoming something;
(x is free from y to do z) (x ranges over agents, y ranges over preventing conditions, z ranges over actions or conditions of character or circumstance). This declaration shows that freedom is a triadic relationship.
Although this relationship doesn't require a human x, it must require something that relates to or is beneficial to humans e.g. free beer, free will, free society; implicit references to owners/consumers
There are also cases where it is not clear what corresponds to the second term. For example, social pressures can prevent one from action, as argued in Mill's On Liberty. It is possible to make the relationship dyadic, by saying Smith is free to leave the country because there are no legal restrictions on him leaving, rather than Smith is free from legal restrictions on travel to leave the country. The former excludes y. However, this should be considered illusory, because there may be other things preventing Smith from leaving.
In cases where it is not clear what corresponds to the third term, one should look at a term figuratively, or at least not concerned with anyone's specific freedom. One could also view something like freedom from hunger; seeing hunger as a barrier. One can also treat this expression in relation to Rooseveltian rhetoric; someone may be on a diet and therefore seek hunger, someone may be on a Ghandi-style hunger strike and actively seek it. Roosevelt wanted a world free of the barrier of hunger, but not one that would prevent the two former examples from achieving their goal; they wouldn't want people to be a victim of hunger they do not sink. This example is triadic. In other idioms, the third term isn't always clear; does freedom of religion entail freedom not to worship. Such issues raise historical doubt, rather than any issue with the third term.
The failing of negative and positive freedom is seeing freedom as a dyadic relation; either freedom from or freedom to. This doesn't do enough to distinguish; only serves to emphasise one or the other of two features of every case of the freedom of agents. Freedom is always freedom from something and freedom to do something (see freedom of religion argument).
3.
The ranges of the variables x y and z can be clarified to illuminate the differences between thinkers. However the distinction between positive and negative freedom stands in the way of this; it suggests that differences in accounts of freedom stem from differences in concept. The issue is that it is the concept of freedom that has been made a political issue, rather than what constitues a person, an obstacle and freedom itself.
Negative and positive freedom distorts important views of freedom by separating thinkers into two separate camps and thus diluting the value and importance of an analytical, philosophical account of freedom. They are too convoluted to fit into the neat x y z variables
The position one should adopt is to say that all thinkers have the same concept of freedom and from here go on to question what can serve as an agent, an obstacle and action/state/character of freedom
4.
This approach to freedom has been overlooked because philosophers have tried to answer the question "when are men free?" which invites misunderstanding by implying people can be free or not free. Being free, with no barriers, cannot be possible because it is so simplified; societal pressures prevent this.
There is a cornucopia of factors to consider when regarding somebody as free; a man who has the legal freedom to have a family doesn't necessarily have the economic freedom - saying he is free to raise a family entails misunderstandings.
Only when such factors are determined will we make about to make rational judgements about the merit of socieities with regard to freedom
5.
If Smith is freed to do d by means of c, as a result of being restricted from doing b by means of a, he is free to do d, but not what he was previously capable of doing; b. This issue conflicts with the problem of persons being either free or not free simply.
The importance of a restriction or freedom decide whether it is worth having/opposing
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